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Introduction
Despite a well-known, growing body of empirical literature calling the classical dichotomy into question, it is still the conventional wisdom in contemporary macroeconomic theory that monetary policy is roughly neutral with respect to aggregate employment and output in the long run. Even though the standard New Keynesian model implies a non-neutrality due to time discounting and ine¢ ciencies due to relative price instability, these long-run e¤ects of monetary policy are quantitatively small for reasonable values of the interest rate and low in ‡ation rates (Ascari (1998) and Graham and Snower (2004) ). 1 This paper, by contrast, o¤ers a new rationale for long-run real e¤ects of monetary policy, resting on envy and guilt. We …nd that for reasonably calibrated values of the relevant parameters, these long-run e¤ects are substantial. This result has important implications for the conduct of mo-netary policy. Our calibration results suggest an optimal in ‡ation rate in the neighborhood of 2 percent.
In particular, we incorporate fairness considerations to an otherwise standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of New Keynesian type with Calvo nominal wage contracts and positive trend in ‡ation. In this context, we show that the classical dichotomy (whereby nominal variables have no long-e¤ect e¤ect on real variables) breaks down in an empirically signi…cant and theoretically novel way. Our rationale for the long-run non-neutrality of monetary policy does not rest on money illusion, departures from rational expectations, or permanent nominal rigidities. Instead, we assume that people are inequity-averse with respect to real incomes, following the seminal work from Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) . Accordingly, people with relatively low income experience envy, whereas those with relatively high income experience guilt. Both experiences generate disutility and, in according with the evidence, the in ‡uence of envy is stronger than that of guilt.
In the presence of Calvo nominal wage contracts, higher in ‡ation implies greater wage dispersion and thus greater dispersion of incomes, generating more envy and guilt. Since people seek to mitigate envy and guilt, they adjust their employment accordingly. Those who experience envy seek to raise their income and do so by increasing their employment, where those who experience guilt reduce their employment. Since the envy e¤ect is stronger than the guilt e¤ect, higher in ‡ation is associated with greater employment and output, thereby generating a long-run Phillips curve tradeo¤.
In this context, we examine the welfare implications of our approach. We …nd that the optimal long-run in ‡ation rate (maximizing steady-state, economy-wide household utility) is positive, in the neighborhood of 2 percent for the standard calibrations. This result is in stark contrast to earlier studies of DSGE models with trend in ‡ation (e.g., King and Wolman (1996) , Kahn et al. (2003) , Yun (2005) , and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007, 2010) ), which …nd optimal monetary policy to either be given by price stability or even by following a de-1 ‡ationary path. Our results are more in line with the aims of practical monetary policy, as practiced by central bankers.
The the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Then section 3 describes our microfounded macro and calibrates it. Section 4 presents the numerical implicatons of the model for the long-run Phillips curve, discusses the underlying intuition, and investigates the sensitivity of the results with respect to key parameters. Section 5 examines optimal monetary policy in the presence of envy and guilt. Finally, section 6 concludes.
Relation to the Literature
Although evidence regarding verticality of the long-run Phillips curve had been mixed over the past century, recent years have witnessed a rapidly growing literature calling the classical dichotomy into question. 2 As Gregory Mankiw puts it "... if one does not approach the data with a prior view favoring long-run neutrality, one would not leave the data with that posterior. The data's best guess is that monetary shocks leave permanent scars on the economy" (Mankiw (2001), p. 48) . This paper provides a new rationale for such empirical …ndings.
The paper also contributes to a growing theoretical literature explaining how a non-vertical long-run Phillips curve can arise (surveyed, for example, by Orphanides and Solow (1990) ). In the context of state-dependent menu costs, see Benabou and Konieczny (1994) , Konieczny (1990) , Kuran (1986), and Naish (1986) . There is also a literature that explains a long-run relation between in ‡ation and employment in terms of fairness, either due to a permanent downward nominal wage rigidity (money illusion) or to departures from rational expectations (Akerlof et al. (1996) , Akerlof and Dickens (2007) ) and (Akerlof et al. (2000) ). Our analysis, by contrast, rests on neither nominal rigidities nor non-rational expectations. 3 2 For the United States, see for example Beyer and Farmer (2007 ), Berentsen et al. (2011 ), Favara and Giordani (2009 ), Karanassou et al. (2008 , Karanassou and Sala (2010) ) and Russell and Banerjee (2008) for the United States. For a wider set of industrialized countries, examples include Ball (1997 ( ), Ericson et al. (2001 , Dolado et al. (2000) , Fair (2000) , Fisher and Seater (1993) , Gottschalk and Fritsche (2005) , King and Watson (1994) , Koutsas (1998) , Koutsas and Serletis (2003) , Koutsas and Veloce (1996) , Schreiber and Wolters (2007) . Empirical studies that study the Phillips curve in terms of the underlying structural macro models include Ahmed and Rogers (1998), Bullard and Keating (1995) , Coenen et al. (2004) and Karanassou et al. (2003 Karanassou et al. ( , 2005 . Concerning developing and emerging countries, see Bae and Ratti (2000) for Argentina and Brazil, by Shelley (2004, 2007) for Nicaragua and Mexico, by Puah et al. (2008) for Singapore, and by Chen (2007) for Taiwan.
3 See also King and Wolman (1996) , Ascari (1998) , and Graham and Snower (2004) , who study the e¤ects of trend in ‡ation in New Keynesian models with nominal frictions and …nd a long-run relation between the growth rate of money and steady state real aggregates. Amano et al. (2007) discuss the in ‡uence of trend in ‡ation on business cycle characteristics such as stochastic means, volatilities, and correlations of macroeconomic aggregates. Based on a second order Taylor approximation around the deterministic steady state they …nd trend in ‡ation to decrease the mean of output while the variance and the persistence of output and in ‡ation increase. Finally, Graham and Snower (2008) derive a non-vertical Phillips curve from hyperbolic discounting by households.
The notion of fairness that we incorporate in a New Keynesian model is based on inequity aversion. This phenomenon, covering both envy and guilt, is supported by a massive empirical literature. 4 A large body of empirical studies in the behavioral economics literature argues that relative income substantially matters for one's subjective well-being. 5 We model inequity aversion along the lines of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) . In our analysis, workers compare their real incomes with the average real income of all the workers, feeling envy when their incomes are relatively low and guilt when they are relatively high. 6 Envy is stronger that guilt, a …nding supported by much empirical evidence. 7 The novel contribution of this paper is to examine the in ‡uence of such inequity aversion on the Phillips curve. As noted, we …nd that this in ‡uence implies a signi…cant, positive long-run relation between in ‡ation and macroeconomic activity for reasonably low in ‡ation rates (say, below 4 percent) and in this context the optimal long-run in ‡ation rate is positive and near 2 percent. This policy implication is noteworthy, since much of the previous literature on optimal monetary policy suggests that prices should decline or remain stable in the long run. According to the Friedman rule, the optimal rate of de ‡ation is equal to the real interest rate. Models that include cash-in-advance constraints, shopping time technologies, and frictions related to the transactional money demand 8 imply that the optimal in ‡ation rate exceeds the Friedman rule, but is still negative. Other models focusing on the costs of price dispersion 9 suggest that the optimal in ‡ation rate is zero. Such policy implications are completely at odds with the practice of monetary policy, where positive in ‡ation targets commonly play a central role. In developed countries typically target low in ‡ation rates in an interval from 2 to 3 percent, while developing countries often apply target values which are slightly higher. 10 There are few theoretical rationales for such practices. 11 Against this backdrop, we provide a new justi…cation for positive in ‡ation targeting. 4 See, for example, Güth et al. (1982) , Forsythe et al. (1994) , Roth et al. (1991) , Henrich et al. (2001) , Karni et al. (2008 ), and Cappelen et al. (2010 . For surveys of the medical, psychological and neuroeconomic background for this behavior, see Camerer et al. (2005) , Loewenstein et al. (2008) . See also the neuroeconomic evidence of Sanfrey et al. (2003) . 5 For example, Argyle (1972 Argyle ( , 1989 , Easterlin (1974 Easterlin ( , 1995 , Kapteyn and Van Herwaarden (1980) , van de Stadt et al. (1985) , Scitovsky (1992) , Clark and Oswald (1996) , Solnick and Hemenway (1998) , Blanch ‡ower and Oswald (2004), and Layard et al. (2009) ). For a thorough survey on the theoretical and empirical literature of the impact of level and relative income on happiness refer to Clark et al. (2008) . 6 This idea draws on theory developed by the psychologists Homans (1961) , Adams (1965) and Walster et al. (1978) . 7 See, for example, Jaques (1956 Jaques ( , 1961 , Messik and Sentis (1979) , and Loewenstein et al. (1989) 8 For example, King and Wolman (1996) , Kahn et al. (2003) , and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007, 2010) , Aruoba and Schorfheide (2011) . 9 For example, Galí (2003) and Woodford (2003) . 1 0 See, for example, Roger and Stone (2005) and Carare and Stone (2006). 1 1 An exception is Graham and Snower (2011) , showing that optimal in ‡ation is positive in the presence of hyperbolic discounting by households. See also Fagan and Messina (2009) and Coibion et al. (2010) .
The Model Economy
As noted, we incorporate inequity aversion into a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities and positive trend in ‡ation. Firms are perfectly competitive, while households are monopolistic competitors. Workers are in…nitely lived and located on the unit interval. Wages are …xed according to the Calvo (1983) nominal contract scheme. 12 The government prints money, issues riskless bonds, and rebates seignorage gains in equal shares to workers as a lump sum. It conducts monetary policy by controlling the growth rate of nominal money supply M t+1 =M t ; which determines long-run in ‡ation 13 t+1 .
Firms
We assume a large number of identical …rms. Firms produces a homogenous good according to a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) CES production function with di¤erentiated labor n j as single input.
The parameter denotes the elasticity of substitution between the di¤erent labor types and y t is output. Cost minimization subject to the …rms production function (1) yields the …rms'demand function for the individual labor type
where w j;t is the period-t real value of household j 0 s nominal contract wage set in t. Due to perfect competition in the product market, …rms take wages and prices as given and produce output at which the price equals marginal cost. Thus the …rms' markup is zero and the aggregate real wage is constant and equal to unity.
Workers
Workers are monopolistic competitors, maximizing the utility subject to the labor demand curves (2) that they face. Wages are …xed according to the 1 2 In a subsequent paper, we also apply the Taylor (1979) staggered contracts scheme and show that the results are quantitatively and qualitatively very similar across both approaches.
1 3 See Nelson (2007 Nelson ( , 2008 . We choose money growth over an interest rate rule because, as Reynard (2007) shows, the short term interest rate empirically fails to deliver accurate information on subsequent in ‡ation, while monetary aggregates have a much greater explanatory power for the developments of subsequent in ‡ation and output. This view is strongly supported by Favara and Giordani (2009) . Karanassou and Sala (2010) argue that money growth captures well the e¤ects of changes in the short term interest rate on in ‡ation, but also covers additional stances of monetary policy such as banking regulations or possible transmission e¤ects of …scal measures on the yield curve. Calvo (1983) nominal contract scheme: in every period, a worker has probability (1 ) to be allowed to reset her contract wage. The worker's utility depends positively on consumption c j;t and negatively on labor n j;t . In addition, the worker dislikes to have more or less real income than the average. The worker j's utility function 14 is
with I j;t being the relative real income position of workers j, which is de…ned as
where w k;t+i is the real value of the current wage of all other workers k. In the spirit of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), worker j compares her real income to the average real income of all other workers j 6 = k. The parameter j;t is an indicator function:
where " represents envy and represents guilt, under the standard restrictions 0 < < 1 and " > 0. Furthermore, " = where > 1; a phenomenon known as egocentric bias. 15 Worker j's period-i budget constraint is
where m and b are real money and bond holdings and are net lump sum transfers from the government to workers. When worker j is allowed to reset her wage, she maximizes her expected utility:
subject to her budget constraint (6) and her labor demand function (2). The optimal wage sets the present value of the marginal disutility of labor (the numerator) equal to the present value of the marginal utility of consumption and the income (the denominator):
Rearranging equation (8), we obtain the labor supply equation
The General Equilibrium
The government prints money m, issues bonds b and gives direct transfers to the workers. The government's budget constraint is
The product market clears:
Aggregate labor is
The aggregate wage index is
Since we focus on the long-run relations between in ‡ation and real variables, we consider the behavior of economic agents in the symmetric steady state. By the aggregate wage index (13) in the steady state, the optimal reset wage (i.e. the real wage in the time period when the wage is reset) is
The model contains three equations and three variables. The equations comprise the reset wage (14), the labor supply (8), and the labor demand (2). The variables are the reset wage, aggregate employment and aggregate output fw ; n; yg.
We solve the model numerically, along the following simple lines. The reset wage (14) follows directly from the calibration. Substituting this into the labor supply equation (8) 
Calibration
We calibrate the model according to standard values in the literature. The annual interest rate is 4 percent, equivalent to a quarterly discount factor = 0:99. Following Talyor (1999), nominal wages as asssumed to remain …xed for one year, on average. Given that the Calvo pricing scheme follows a poisson process, this average duration is generated by a Calvo parameter = 0:75, representing the probability that the nominal wage remains unchanged during the period of analysis. The elasticity of substitution among the di¤erent types of labor is = 5, implying a steady state wage markup of 25%, supported by Graham and Snower (2011) and close to values reported by Ascari (2000), Erceg et al. (2000) , and Galí et al. (2011) . The parameter denotes the inverse of the labor supply elasticity in the zero in ‡ation steady state. 16 Following Yun (1996) and empirical evidence from Imai and Keane (2004) and Ransom and Sims (2010) , we set the elasticity of labor supply to = 4, implying that = 0:25. Furthermore, following Ascari and Merkl (2009) , the weight of labor in the utility function = 1:05 is chosen so that workers work approximately one-third of their available time endowment in the zero in ‡ation steady state.
Finally, we calibrate the parameters governing envy and guilt in accordance with recent experimental evidence. Based on the results from the experimental literature on ultimatum games, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) derive a distribution for the envy and guilt paramters. Averaging the distribution yields = 0:32 and " = 0:85. These parameter values imply that envy times stronger than guilt by a factor is = 2:7, identical to that supported by Loewenstein et al. (1989) . 17 Table 1 summarizes our base calibration. 1 6 Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Domeij and Flodén (2006) show that is the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply. In particular, this elasticity measures the reaction of labor supply to an intertemporal reallocation of wages, given a constant marginal utility of wealth. A formal proof that = 1 holds in the zero in ‡ation steady state can also be found in the appendix.
1 7 The authors …nd the disadvantageous part of the utility function to be approximately 2:7 times as steep as the advantageous part for neutral relationships. Figure 1 presents the Phillips curve for the base calibration given in Table 1 . On the vertical axis we show the deviations of aggregate employment and output from their respective values at the zero in ‡ation steady state. The horizontal axis measures the steady state in ‡ation rate. 18 This …gure implies that monetary policy has substantial long-run real e¤ects. Expansionary monetary policy that raises in ‡ation from = 0% to = 2% is associated with an increase in aggregate employment by 1:40 percent and in aggregate output by 1:32 percent. (As we will show in Section 4.2, the positive relation between in ‡ation and macroeconomic activity is almost entirely driven by the in ‡uence of envy and guilt.) The expansionary e¤ect of monetary policy declines as the in ‡ation rate rises. For in ‡ation rates above around = 2:25%, further increases in the rate of money growth lead to reduced aggregate employment and output.
Intuition
In our analysis, there are four channels whereby monetary policy a¤ects output and employment in the long run.
1. The employment cycling e¤ect: When in ‡ation is positive, the real wage falls over the contract period (since the nominal wage is constant over the contract period while the price level rises). Under Calvo wage staggering, di¤erent workers reset their nominal wages at di¤erent times. For those workers that have recently reset their nominal wages, the real wage is relatively high; whereas those workers that have not done so, the real wage is relatively low. In short, in ‡ation is accompanied by ‡uctuations of relative wages. These ‡uctuations lead to ‡uctuations in relative employment rates across workers, as …rms substitute cheap labor for expensive labor. Since di¤erent workers are imperfect substitutes in production, this substitution is ine¢ cient. The greater is the in ‡ation rate, the greater is the amount of labor substitution and, due to the resulting ine¢ ciency, the lower is aggregate output. In short, employment cycling implies an inverse relation between in ‡ation and macroeconomic activity.
2. The labor smoothing e¤ect: The greater the in ‡ation rate, the more the worker's labor supply varies over the cycle. Workers dislike variable labor supply trajectories, since their marginal disutility of labor rises with labor supplied. Thus a rise in in ‡ation leads to a rise in the average real reservation wage over the contract period and thereby to a fall in employment and output. So labor smoothing also yields an inverse relation between in ‡ation and macroeconomic activity.
3. The envy-guilt e¤ect: Workers experience relatively low incomes early in the contract period and relatively high incomes later. 19 Thus they experience envy early on. To reduce their disutility from envy, they reduce their average wage so as to increase their average employment. Conversely, they experience guilt later in the contract period, leading them to reduce average employment. But since envy is stronger than guilt, average employment rises. The greater is the in ‡ation rate, the greater is the associated employment and output. Thereby the envy-guilt e¤ect generates a positive relation between in ‡ation and macroeconomic activity.
4. The discounting e¤ect: As noted, at the beginning of the contract period the worker's real wage is relatively high and his employment is relatively low, and conversely later on. The worker has a constant rate of time preference, and thus future utilities are discounted more heavily than present utilities. So the relatively high marginal disutilities of work occuring late in the contract period are discounted more heavily than the relatively low marginal disutilities of work occuring earlier. Accordingly, the discounting e¤ect leads households to supply more labor. Furthermore, guilt (felt late in the contract period) is more heavily a¤ected by discounting than envy (felt early in the contract period). Since guilt reduces labor supply while envy stimulates it, the discounting e¤ect leads to a further increase in labor supply.
Needless to say, the latter discounting e¤ect is complementary with the envyguilt e¤ect. This complementarity is illustrated in Figure 2 , where the upper two Phillips curves portray the relation between in ‡ation (on the horizontal axis) Figure 2 : The Complementarity between the Discounting and Envy-Guilt Effects and employment and output (on the vertical axis) in the presence of both the discounting and envy-guilt e¤ects (as well as the other e¤ects above), whereas the lower two Phillips curves portray this relation in the absence of the discounting e¤ect. The vertical di¤erence measures the size of the complementarity between the discounting e¤ect and the envy-guilt e¤ect (with respect to employment and output). Figure 3 shows the sensitivity of the Phillips curve with respect to a range of values for the envy and guilt parameters that have been found in the literature. Holding egocentric bias constant ( , representing the relation between envy and guilt: " = ), the left panel of Figure 3 shows the Phillips curve for the following values of guilt parameter: 2 (0:24; 0:32; 0:39). Whereas our base case is = 0:32, the value = 0:24 was supported by Fehr and Schmidt (2003) and the value = 0:39 was found by Goeree and Holt (2000) . 20 Figure 3 shows, not surprisingly, that when the guilt and envy e¤ects strengthen the positive long-run e¤ect of monetary policy on output and employment increases.
Sensitivities
The right panel of Figure 3 indicates that this positive e¤ect rises with the degree of egocentric bias, i.e. the greater the envy associated with any given level of guilt, the more monetary policy stimulates output and employment in the long run. This result is also not surprising in the light of the analysis above. The …gure shows the Phillips curve for the following values of the egocentric Figure 3 : Sensitivity with respect to guilt parameters bias parameter: 2 (1; 2:7; 3:5; 5:1), where our base case is = 2:7. With the exception of = 1, all values of the parameters were found in Loewenstein at al. (1989) . In particular, while = 2:7 was found for a neutral relationship between the judging subject and her reference subject, Loewenstein et al. (1989) …nd that = 3:5 and = 5:1 to apply to positive and negative relationship environments, respectively. Moreover, to highlight the importance of the egocentric bias, Figure 3 also displays the results for = 1, i.e. in the abscence of any egocentric bias. In this case, the envy and guilt e¤ects play a negligible role and therefore, monetary policy has no substantial positive implications for long-run output and employment. This result holds irrespective of the value of . Figure 4 shows the sensitivity of the Phillips curve with respect to reasonable values for the labor supply and labor substitution elasticities = 1 and . The left panel of Figure 4 juxtaposes Phillips curves for the labor supply elasticities 2 (1:5; 4; 9), where our base case is = 4 ( = 0:25). The higher labor supply elasticitiy = 9 ( = 0:11) was estimated by Abowd and Card (1989) and the lower value = 1:5 ( = 0:66) was found by Mulligan (1998) and Heckman et al. (1998) . The latter is very close to the values chosen by Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) and Hansen and Wright (1992) in their theoretical contributions. As is apparent from the left panel of Figure 4 , the lower the labor supply elasticity (i.e. the higher ), the smaller the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy with respect to aggregate employment and output. Intuitively, the greater the convexity of utility with respect to labor, the more aversive are households to a nonsmooth path of labor supply and therefore, the stronger is the labor smoothing e¤ect. 21 As discussed above, the labor smoothing e¤ect raises the average real reservation wage, thereby reducing employment and output. Consequently, the Phillips curve shifts downwards. 
Figure 4: Sensitivity with respect to elasticities
The right panel of Figure 4 shows how the long-run Phillips curve is a¤ected by the degree of labor substitutability over the interval 2 (1:5; 5; 10). The higher the value , the more substitutable are the labor types. We contrast our base case = 5 with a very low degree of substitutability = 1:5 as estimated by Ciccone and Peri (2005) and a high degree of substitutability = 10 as found in Fagan and Messina (2009) . 22 As the right panel of Figure 4 indicates, the more substitutable labor types are, the greater the real e¤ects of monetary policy, but over a narrower range. Intuitively, raising the substitutability of labor types has three e¤ects on aggregate. First, it reduces the ine¢ ciencies from labor substitution, so that for a given the amount of employment cycling, output increases. Second, labor substitution becomes cheaper, increasing the incentive for employment cycling, so that output decreases 23 (ceteris paribus). Third, the increase in employment cycling raises the dispersion of incomes, thereby eliciting more envy and guilt. Since the envy e¤ect is greater than the guilt e¤ect, aggregate output increases (ceteris paribus). As is apparent from the right panel of Figure 4 , the positive e¤ects on output (particularly from the envy e¤ect) 24 are dominant at low in ‡ation rates, whereas the negative e¤ects on output (from additional employment cycling) are dominant at higher in ‡ation . For = 0:66, increases from 1:05 to 1:65, while it decreases to 0:9025 for = 0:11.
2 2 On the basis on various country studies, Aidt and Tzannatos (2002) summarize that the average wage markup in industrialized as well as in developing countries lies in the intervall between 10 and 25%, which implies 5 10. The low value found by Ciccone and Peri (2005) arises from the fact that they explicitely estimate the markup for high skilled workers over low skilled workers. Figure 5 indicates that the stickier wages are, the more e¤ective is monetary policy, but over a narrower range. Intuitively, the stickier wages are, the larger is real wage dispersion and thus the larger is real income dispersion. Consequently, there is more envy and guilt, and since the envy e¤ect is strong, output increases. On the other hand, a larger real wage dispersion implies more labor substitution, which promotes the employment cycling and thereby reduces output. The envy e¤ect dominates at low in ‡ation rates, whereas the employment cycling e¤ects dominates at high in ‡ation rates.
Optimal Monetary Policy
In the long run, the optimal rate of money growth (equal to the optimal in ‡ation rate) maximizes the lifetime utility of the representative household:
subject to the labor demand contraint (2), the labor supply constraint (8), and the reset wage (14).
The following table presents the optimal in ‡ation rates for our base calibration, as well as for other values of the envy-guilt parameters. Recalling that in = 0:24 = 0:32 = 0:39 = 2:7 1.69% 1.80% 1.92% = 3:5 1.97% 2.16% 2.30% = 5:1 2.47% 2.76% 2.97% Table 2 : Welfare with respect to envy and guilt the base case = 2:7 and = 0:32, we …nd that optimal in ‡ation is slightly below 2 percent in our base calibration. The higher value of the guilt parameter (with constant egocentric bias) implies a slightly higher optimal in ‡ation rate, and conversely for a lower value of the guilt parameter. Furthermore, greater egocentric bias (with a constant guilt parameter) implies higher optimal in ‡ation, and conversely for less egocentric bias. The intuition underlying these results is straightforward. The optimal in ‡ation rate is positive for two reasons: (1) When the in ‡ation rate is zero, output and employment are ine¢ ciently low, since workers are monopolistic competitors in the labor market.
(2) Due to the envy-guilt and discounting e¤ects, higher in ‡ation is associated with greater output and employment, over a range of low in ‡ation rates. On this account, a positive long-run rate of money growth is able to reduce the ine¢ ciency from monopolistic competition. More precisely, when the money growth rate rises above zero, it a¤ects welfare in the following ways: (1) it reduces the ine¢ ciency from monopolistic competition and thereby raises the utility from consumption, (2) it raises the ine¢ ciency from employment cycling, (3) it increases the disutility of labor due to a more volatile labor trajectory and (4) it increases the disutility from envy and guilt. While the …rst in ‡uence enters the utility function linearly in output, the other in ‡uences grow exponentially as in ‡ation increases output and employment. Thus the …rst in ‡uence dominates at low in ‡ation rates, whereas the latter in ‡uences dominate at higher in ‡ation rates.
Needless to say, the ine¢ ciency from monopolistic competition can be reduced in ways other than expansionary monetary policy and these other ways may have more favorable welfare e¤ects than expansionary monetary policy. But the overarching implication of our analysis is this. If, for whatever reason, 25 the equilibrium levels of output and employment are ine¢ ciently lowafter the government has implemented all its …scal and structural policiesthen expansionary monetary policy can be welfare-promoting by reducing the residual ine¢ ciency.
shows how the optimal in ‡ation rate varies with respect to di¤erent values 26 for the intertemporal and intratemporal labor substitution elasticities and ; respectively, and the degree of wage stickiness . Table 3The …rst two rows of Table 3 indicate that the optimal in ‡ation rate is negatively related to the inverse of the labor supply elasticity = 1 .
2 5 There are of course many conceivable reasons why output and employment may be too low, such as distortionary taxes, e¢ ciency-wage, insider-outsider, or union-power e¤ects.
2 6 We use the values chosen in the sensitivity analysis. 14 = 0:24 = 0:32 = 0:39 alternative :
= 0:11 2.31% 2.53% 2.67% = 0:66 0.92% 0.97% 1.01% alternative : = 1:5 3.23% 3.30% 3.45% = 10 0.96% 0.97% 0.99% alternative :
= 0:66 1.93% 2.14% 2.18% = 0:82 1.51% 1.59% 1.65% Table 3 : Welfare with respect to model parameters Intuitively, when the convexity of utility with respect to labor rises, the disutility of work increases relative to the utility of consumption. Since the bene…ts of extra output decline more rapidly, reducing the optimal in ‡ation rate. The next two rows of Table 3 show that the greater the substitutability among labor types, the lower is the optimal in ‡ation rate. The degree of substitutability measures the market power of the di¤erent worker types. The lower , the higher is the market power of each labor type, and thus the larger is the ine¢ ciency from monopolistic competition, implying a lower optimal in ‡ation rate.
Finally, the last two rows of Table 3 indicate that the greater is the degree of wage stickiness, the lower is the optimal in ‡ation rate. Intuitively, the greater is the degree of wage stickiness the more dispersed is the real wage distribution and the greater is employment cycling. This reduces utility due to the ine¢ ciency of employment cycling, households'aversion to volatile incomes, and the envy and guilt e¤ects. Thus the optimal in ‡ation rate falls.
Conclusion
We have shown that, in the presence of staggered, monopolistically competitive nominal wage contracts, inequity aversion can generate a positive long-run tradeo¤ between in ‡ation and macroeconomic activity. Under these circumstances, our analysis implies that expansionary monetary policy -leading to a low, positive in ‡ation rate -is socially optimal. For our base calibration, the optimal in ‡ation rate is just under 2 percent.
Our analysis is meant to help bridge the gap between monetary theory and central banking practice. In contrast to much of the recent literature on monetary policy, we provide a rationale for targeting in ‡ation at a low, positive rate.
In our analysis, the relation between in ‡ation and macroeconomic activity is the outcome of four phenomena: employment cycling, labor supply variability, discounting and envy-guilt e¤ects. The …rst two phenomena imply an inverse relation between in ‡ation and macroeconomic activity, whereas the last two are complementary and imply a positive relation. Furthermore, the last two dominate at low in ‡ation rates, whereas the …rst two dominate at high in ‡ation rates. Consequently, the Phillips curve is backward-bending, so that increases in money growth lead to higher employment and output at low in ‡ation, but to lower employment and output at high in ‡ation.
In this context, the role of optimal monetary policy is to reduce ine¢ ciencies that generate suboptimally low employment and output. This provides a rationale for a low, positive long-run in ‡ation target. In the steady state we drop time indices
Grouping terms
and re-arranging yields the optimal relative steady state wage
Wage dispersion
From aggregate labor and the individual labor demand we get
n t = s t y t :
Furthermore
= (1 )w k;t + (1 + )
"
(1 )w k;t 1 + (1 ) w k;t 2 (1 + ) 1 + : : :
which in the steady state is given by
Derivation of Labor Supply Curve
The worker maximizes utility
subject to its budget constraint
where m and b are real money and bond holdings and are lump sum transfers from the government to workers and the downward-sloping labor demand
and inequity aversion
where N denotes the average income in the economy. The …rst order condition of this maximization problem yields
(1 )Z I n j;t+i (1 + ) i = 0: (33) Re-arranging equation (33) we get
Rearranging equation (34) with respect to w j;t yields
From the utility function U (c j ; n j ; I j ) = c j;t n 1+
we obtain the …rst order conditions V n , U c , and Z I :
Plugging equations (37), (38), and (39) into (35) gives the optimal reset wage as in Section 3.2
where w = 1 denotes the markup. This is equation (8) in Section 3. Rearranging equation (40) yields the labor supply equation (9
Note that envy and guilt needs to be considered separately, i.e. the term to the right in the denominator is de…ned as
where denotes the threshold at which the worker exceeds the average income in the economy and j;t is an indicator function, which takes values
Applying the downward sloping labor demand equation (31), we can write equation (41) in terms of aggregate labor.
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Rearranging terms w 1+
(1 + )
( 1) i y t+i j;t+i I j;t+i :
(45) In the steady state we drop time indices
(46) In order to be able to solve the model numerically, we need to let the in…nite sums converge. The sum formulation in the numerator can be written in terms of in…nite geometric sums according to X 1 k=o x k = 1 1 x . In the case of the denominator this is a lot more complicated. Remember that there is a kink due to envy and guilt, which we need to account for. Therefore, let us look at the envy and guilt part separately for a moment, which is given by
and needs to be split into two di¤erent intervals; envy and guilt 
which can be rewritten as
The sum formulation can be written in terms of (in-)…nite geometric sums according to the following rules X 1 k=
Plugging equation (51) back into equation (46) and applying the convergence rules to the numerator and the consumption part in the denominator yields
Note that for zero steady state in ‡ation the envy and guilt parts cancel each other out and vanish.
1 w = y .
Linear Inequity Aversion
In this section we give proof of the inviability of the original version of Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) utility function in our model setup. We show that for zero in ‡ation, the model does not break down to the standard NKM with trend in ‡ation. Assume a utility function analogous to equation (3), only with inequity aversion entering linearly as suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) .
Income inequality I j;t is again de…ned by equation (4). Under linear inequity aversion I j;t changes signs, depending on the position in the income distribution, i.e. I j;t < 0 for having a lower than average real income and I j;t > 0 for having a higher than average real income. To make sure that inequity aversion always enters utility negatively, we calibrate the envy and guilt parameters according to the following scheme:
Everything else equal, a resetting worker chooses the optimal reset wage to be
which according to the above derivation has a steady state equivalent in aggregate terms of
Again, looking at envy and guilt (the right term in the denominator) more closely yields
Letting the (in)…nite sums converge yields EG = "
(+ )
( 1)
+ (1 + )
( 1) 1 (1 + ) ( 1) :
Consequently, equation (57) :
(60) Note that this equation breaks down to the standard version only if we assume envy and guilt to be absent, i.e. " = = 0. In case of zero in ‡ation there is no envy and guilt due to the fact that there is no wage dispersion. 
However, equation (60) still inhabits the second component in the denominator, governing the disutility from inequity aversion. Therefore, envy and guilt in ‡uence the steady state even when there is no envy and guilt in action. From this we conclude that the linear version of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) utility function is not viable in our standard DSGE model.
The Welfare Function
Usually, one needs to take the per-period utility and plug in the expressions c j = y( ) and n j = sy( ), with s being the price dispersion and y( ) being the optimal output which I have derived from my optimization problem, i.e. the Phillips curve. Hence, the optimal in ‡ation rate is the value which gives me the max utility. This approach cannot be implemented in the model with envy and guilt as well. The problem that arises with this procedure in the envy model is, however, that the per period utility function is not stable across time.
In the envy and guilt model it is
where the latter term is time dependent. If you reset your wage, you feel envy.
On the other hand, if you haven't reset your wage for a while, you feel guilt. So there is a discontinuity in the utility function with respect to time, which causes j;t to take two di¤erent values. I can overcome this problem by putting the steady state Phillips curve into the converging utility function. Figure 6 : Sensitivity with respect to substitution elasticity
